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
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CPW REPORT No. 75-A --COMMUNIST CHINA

(May 18 - 24 1953)

SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

## SUMMARY

Continued Soviet penetration into Sinkiang is illustrated by reports that Soviet planes are readily available for fighting locusts, upon call from Soviet experts attached to local offices. China's need to adopt superior Soviet techniques and study Russian ideology continues to be stressed, but Sino-Soviet friendship and China's debt to Russia seem deemphasized. Russian leadership is pointed up in the importance attached to the 25 April PRAVDA editorial, but Peking comment pictures Moscow as merely underwriting Chinese and North Korean peace plans. Russia's sincerity is represented as unquestioned even in Western Nations, but U.S. actions are said to show no evidence of a genuine desire for peace.

Stories of widespread hardship suggest that local problems may be forcing Peking to delay closer ideological alignment with Moscow. Work relief, direct food distribution, and loans are instituted in disaster areas: tax relief is granted; and, private merchants are guaranteed a profit in the turnover of native products. In addition to forcing local officials to halt the peasant movement to the cities, city benefactors are pressured into inducing the peasants to return home.

Evidence of dissatisfaction is readily discernible. Youth Corps members are criticized for seeking machine operators' jobs rather than posts in Party administrative offices; elections are staged to eliminate officials out of sympathy with Party aims; teachers are still said to need special indoctrination; informers' letters are encouraged; and, reports tell of violation of discipline, "unrealistic quotas," and "shortage of responsible personnel." Rural cadres are severely criticized for alienating independent farmers by forcing them to join mutual aid teams and cooperatives, and are charged with hindering production through bureaucratic practices, such as the destruction of plants that were improperly laid out.

Friction between Tibetans and the People's Liberation Army is suggested by repeated emphasis on PLA achievements and the gains accruing to Tibetans. PLA men rigidly observe local customs, it is claimed, "staying away from Lama temples," but Tibetans are warned to overcome their "narrow racial prejudices," and are reminded that Tibet now is "an integral part" of China.

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